In a frequency hopping multiple access (FHMA) system a set of users communicate simultaneously using frequency hopping sequences defined on the same set of frequency channels. A frequency hopping sequence specifies which channels to use as communication progresses. A set of frequency hopping sequences used in an FHMA is called a frequency hopping scheme (FHS). Much of the research on the performance of FHS is based on either pairwise mutual interference or adversarial interference but not both. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of an FHS with respect to both group-wise mutual interference and adversarial interference (jamming), bearing in mind that more than two users may be transmitting simultaneously in the presence of an adversary. We point out a correspondence between a cover-free code and a frequency hopping scheme. Cover-free codes give a lower bound on the transmission capacity of the FHS. Furthermore, we specify a jammer model and consider what additional properties a cover-free code should have to resist the jammer. We show that a purely combinatorial approach is inadequate against such a jammer, but that with the use of pseudorandomness, we can have a system that has high throughput as well as secure against jamming.
Introduction
Frequency hopping is a modulation technique that employ frequency hopping (FH) sequences in spread spectrum transmission. This technology was first introduced to allow multiple number of users to be co-located within the same spectrum. Further, it was introduced to mitigate interference from unauthorized users of a communication system on the assumption that the unauthorised users have no knowledge of the frequency hopping sequences being used [17] . They are widely used in signal transmission such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and ultrawideband (UWB) communications [6, 11, 19] . Frequency hopping sequences specify the frequency channels on which a transmitter/receiver sends/receives data as transmission progresses. The main requirement for the transmitter-receiver pair to communicate is that they need to be on the same frequency channel at the same time. So a communicating pair of users need to share a frequency hopping sequence. When a number of users employ FH sequences which are defined on the same set of frequency channels, they form a frequency hopping multiple access (FHMA) system. We will consider properties of frequency hopping sequences for FHMA systems when used in the presence of adversarial interference. 1 
Background 2.1 Preliminaries
Let F = {f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f m−1 } be a finite alphabet of m frequency channels available to an FHMA system; F is called a frequency library. For simplicity, we assume a one-to-one mapping between the frequency channels in F and a set of m elements, that is we write i for f i , 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1. Definition 2.1. A frequency hopping (FH) sequence is a sequence X = (x t ) v−1 t=0 (or X = (x t ) if there is no ambiguity) of length v over a frequency library F. Definition 2.2. A (v, k, m)-frequency hopping scheme ((v, k, m)-FHS), is a set S = {X i : 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1} of size k where X i is an FH sequence of length v over a frequency library F of size m.
Let S be a (v, k, m)-FHS. A transmitter and a receiver share an FH sequence X = (x t ) ∈ S. The channel to be used for transmission/reception at each time slot t is given as x t .
Pairwise Mutual Interference
Given an FHS, the use of the same frequency channel at the same time by two frequency hopping sequences (or more) causes interference. Pairwise mutual interference is where two frequency hopping sequences in an FHS interfere with each other. Formally, we described pairwise mutual interference as pairwise Hamming correlation or simply Hamming correlation. Let S be a 
where h(x, y) = 1 if x = y, 0 if x = y.
Note that the operations on indices are performed modulo v. When X = Y we write H X (τ ) for H X,X (τ ) and this is the Hamming autocorrelation of X.
We define the maximum out of phase Hamming auto-correlation of an FH sequence X ∈ S as H(X) = max
and the maximum Hamming cross-correlation between any two distinct FH sequences X and
Further, we define
Lempel and Greenberger in [12] developed the following bounds which are about sequences. Lemma 2.3 (Lempel-Greenberger bound I, [12] , Lemma 4). For every sequence X = (x t ) of length v over F, |F| = m,
Lemma 2.4 (Lempel-Greenberger bound II, [12] , Lemma 5) . For every pair of sequences X, Y of length
We define the maximum periodic Hamming auto-correlation of a set S, H a (S), and the maximum periodic Hamming cross-correlation of a set S, H c (S), as
Further, we define the maximum Hamming correlation of a set S as
Peng and Fan in [15] gave the following bound for the maximum Hamming correlation of a set of sequences.
Most researchers use the following to define optimality of frequency hopping sequences. A frequency hopping sequence X ∈ S is said to be optimal in the Lempel-Greenberger bound if the bound (2) is met. A pair of frequency hopping sequences X, Y ∈ S is called an optimal pair in the Lempel-Greenberger bound if it satisfy equality in the bound (3). Finally, a (v, k, m)-FHS, S, is said to be an optimal frequency hopping scheme in the Peng-Fan bound if the bound (4) is met. It was shown in [15] that the Lempel-Greenberger bounds are special cases of the Peng-Fan bound. Therefore optimality in the Peng-Fan bound implies optimality in the Lempel-Greenberger bounds.
There are many frequency hopping sequence constructions that use pairwise Hamming correlation, as a measure of how good the frequency hopping sequences are and meet the bounds (2), (3) and (4) . We now consider some of such constructions that use algebra, combinatorial designs as well as codes. Lempel and Greenberger [12] construct sets of optimal frequency hopping sequences from algebraic transforms of m-sequences. Fuji-Hara et al. [7] provide combinatorial constructions using affine geometries, cyclic designs and difference families, of frequency hopping sequences optimal in the Lempel-Greenberger bound. Using cyclotomy as well as quadratic residues, Chung and Yang [3] obtain sets of frequency hopping sequences with new parameters, optimal in the Lempel-Greenberger bound. Ding et al. [4] employ Reed-Solomon codes to obtain FH sequences optimal in the Peng-Fan bound. Using cyclotomy and the Chinese remainder theorem, Ren et al. [18] obtain sets of frequency hopping sequences meeting the Peng-Fan bound. Ren's constructions are a generalisation of the constructions in [4] and [23] which also use cyclotomy over finite fields. Wang [21] use the trace function to construct sets of frequency hopping sequences that are also optimal in the Peng-Fan bound. The frequency hopping sequences constructions given above and others, are all optimal in the sense of meeting either the Lempel-Greenberger bound or the Pen-Fan bound. However, both bounds are based on pairwise Hamming correlation. We will explain in Section 2.4 the insufficiency of using pairwise correlation and we analyse frequency hopping schemes using Hamming group correlation.
Adversarial Interference
Interference originating from unauthorised entities where signals are deliberately transmitted to interfere with legitimate transmission is called adversarial interference or jamming. We discuss more on this in Section 3.2.
Now we describe the work of Bag et al. in [2] and Emek and Wattenhofer in [5] who consider adversarial interference only and not Hamming correlation. Bag et al. [2] use Latin squares to obtain sets of frequency hopping sequences. The FH sequences constructed achieve maximum transmission rate of 100% without adversarial interference. All legitimate FH sequences share a pair of secret pseudorandom numbers before the start of communication which are used in an entire session. The adversary can jam at most a certain number of the frequency channels. It was shown in [13] that an adversary only needs to eavesdrop on a single time slot to obtain the pair of secret shared pseudorandom numbers. Acquiring the secret numbers enables the adversary to derive legitimate FH sequence and thus interfere with any sequence of its choice. Emek and Wattenhofer in [5] construct sequences as a random walk on an expander graph. The authors consider a single pairwise communication where subsequent channels for transmission are included in the data transmitted. An adversary can eavesdrop and jam a certain fraction of the available frequency channels. In this paper two adversarial models were considered. In the first model, an adversary can only acquire information about the channel that was used in previous time slots after a certain number of time slots have lapsed, but not the content, while in the second model it has knowledge of both. Knowing the transmitted messages is important since the content specifies the next channels. At any time slot, the sequence is guaranteed successful transmission with probability at least 1 − θ − ǫ where θ is the fraction of the channels an adversary jams and ǫ is a security parameter that defines the resilience of the FH sequence. However, it is not clear what happens if more than one pair (transmitter/receiver) of communication occurs simultaneously.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we evaluate the performance of an FHS with respect to both group-wise mutual interference and adversarial interference. This framework was introduced in [13] , bearing in mind that more than two users can be transmitting simultaneously in the presence of an adversary therefore rending the pairwise mutual interference criterion inadequate.
An overview of our contributions are as follows. We refine the system and attacker models which were introduced in [13] . We point out a correspondence between a cover-free code and a frequency hopping scheme. We note that when a cover-free code is considered as a frequency hopping scheme, a user can successfully transmit in at least a specified fraction of time in the presence of a given number of interfering FH sequences. We specify a jammer model for an FHS. Considering the resources and knowledge of a jammer, we look at how a frequency hopping scheme can mitigate against the jammer. We examine necessary and desirable additional properties of cover-free codes such that they can be used in the presence of adversarial interference. A cover-free code will enable us to determine the number of places an FH sequence can be successfully used in the presence of other interfering FH sequences. However, it provides no additional information for use of the FH sequences in the presence of adversarial interference. Therefore, we seek to determine these additional properties of cover-free codes that mitigate adversarial interference activities. Finally we discuss the limitations of cover-free codes against a jammer, and we propose the use of pseudorandomness to improve resistance against a jammer.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3 we introduce the system model and the necessary notation. In Section 4 we introduce cover-free codes and show their equivalence to frequency hopping schemes. Section 4 also examine the additional properties of cover-free codes to defend against jamming. In Section 5 we discuss how pseudo-randomness can be used to strengthen cover-free codes to withstand a jammer so that the FH sequences can be used for longer periods of time. We conclude in Section 6.
3 System and Attacker Model
A single sequence is used by a single transmitter/receiver pair to communicate in the presence of both mutual and adversarial interference. We first consider the case of mutual interference. Definition 3.1. The Hamming group correlation G(X, U ) between an FH sequence X ∈ S and the FH sequences in U ⊆ S, |U | = w, 1 ≤ w ≤ k, is defined as the number of time slots in X that use the same frequency channels as the corresponding time slots of some FH sequence in
Note that the notion of Hamming group correlation is the complement of the group distance defined in [9] when a (v, k, m)-FHS is considered as a set of k codewords of length v over F. The Hamming group correlation G(X, U ) gives the number of time slots of an FH sequence X that are blocked by the FH sequences in the w-subset U of S.
We define a session as being made up of v time slots, that is one full length of an FH sequence. We now define the throughput of a frequency hopping sequence. We use the basic throughput defined here to develop further throughput measures of a frequency hopping scheme.
Then the w-throughput of X with respect to U is the rate of successful transmission of X in a session in the presence of FH sequences in U ,
It is desirable that ρ w (X, U ) be large, which means an FH sequence transmits in many time slots.
Ideally, we aim to construct a (v, k, m)-FHS that maximizes throughput in both the average case and worst case. We now define these two cases. Definition 3.3. Let S be a (v, k, m)-FHS. The average w-throughput of X ∈ S is the average number of time slots in which X can successfully send information if w other sequences in S are being used,ρ
Definition 3.4. The average w-throughput of an FH sequence in a set V ⊆ S, |V| = w + 1 is
Thus given a (w + 1)-subset V of a (v, k, m)-FHS, S, Equation (8) gives the average number of time slots in which an FH sequence X ∈ V can successfully transmit information if the other w FH sequences are also transmitting. Definition 3.5. The average w-throughput of a (v, k, m)-FHS, S is given as
In this paper, however, we focus on the worst-case w-throughput, which gives the lowest possible throughput over a session in a communication system. We first look at the case without an adversary. The worst-case w-throughput in the presence of an adversary will be dealt with in Section 3.2.
So, given an FH sequence X ∈ S, Equation (10) gives the minimum number of time slots in which the FH sequence can transmit data if some w FH sequences in S are also in use.
Next we consider the worst-case w-throughput of a particular subset of a (v, k, m)-FHS. 
We conclude with the worst-case w-throughput of an FHS. Definition 3.8. The worst-case w-throughput of a (v, k, m)-FHS, S, is the minimum of the valuesρ w (V) for each w + 1-set V in S,
A (v, k, m)-FHS, S, with worst-case w-throughputρ w (S) will be denoted a (v, k, m;ρ w (S))-FHS.
Attacker Model
We consider the presence of an adversary that sends noisy signals on frequency channels to block the signal transmissions of legitimate users; we call this adversary a jammer. The jammer knows F, the (v, k, m)-FHS, S, and the number of FH sequences to be used in a session, w + 1 (0 < w < k). However, the jammer has no knowledge of the actual FH sequences to be used.
Its strategy is to eavesdrop and jam. At each time slot it has enough resources to eavesdrop on θ 1 m channels, 0 ≤ θ 1 ≤ 1, and jam on θ 2 m channels, 0 ≤ θ 2 < 1. We assume that it cannot jam all the frequency channels at each time slot. It can use the information it acquires while eavesdropping to make choices of which channels to jam. This adversary is described as a (θ 1 , θ 2 )-adaptive jammer. When a signal is jammed, legitimate users hear noise and acknowledge failure of transmission. So we treat a jamming signal as an erasure.
We model a jammer's channel selection strategy for jamming as a set of FH sequences J = {Y i |i = 0, . . . , θ 2 m − 1}, where Y i is an FH sequence of length v over F. Definition 3.9. The (w, J )-throughput of an FH sequence X in the presence of both other legitimate FH sequences in U ⊆ S, |U | = w and jamming FH sequences of J is
The rest of the measures introduced in Section 3.1 can be easily modified to measure the throughput of a (v, k, m)-FHS in the presence of both mutual interference and adversary. These are summarised in Table 1 . Table 1 : Performance measures of FHS in the presence of mutual interference and jamming.
In this paper, the goal of a jammer is to reduce the worst-case w-throughput of a (v, m, k)-FHS.
In the literature, jammers are classified according to their capabilities (broadband or narrowband) and their behaviour (constant, random or reactive) [14, 16, 22] . Our (θ 1 , θ 2 )-adaptive jammer includes all the jammers that apply to an FHS. For example, a broadband jammer means the jammer jams on contiguous set of channels and so we can consider this as θ 2 m > 1. If we consider a constant jammer, that jams on the same channel(s) as time progresses, then we have a (θ 1 , θ 2 )-adaptive jammer where for any 
Cover-free codes
The notion of cover-free codes has been used in [9, 10, 20] for blacklisting and traitor tracing schemes. In this paper we use the definition of Staddon et al [20] . Definition 4.1 (Staddon, Stinson and Wei, [20] ). Suppose that S is a (v, k, m)-code. For any subset S ′ ⊆ S and any X ∈ F v , define
Then S is called (w, α)-cover-free code, denoted (w, α)-CFC, if |I(Z, S ′ )| < (1 − α)v for any S ′ ⊆ S, |S ′ | = w and any Z ∈ S \ S ′ .
Note that a (v, k, m; d)-code is a (1, d/v)-CFC. We are interested in the cases where w > 1.
Equivalence of Cover Free Codes and Frequency Hopping Schemes
There is a direct correspondence between a frequency hopping scheme with a given Hamming group correlation and a cover free code.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose S is a (v, k, m)-code over F, |F| = m. Then S is a (w, α)-CFC if and only if S is a (v, m, k)-FHS with worst-case w-throughput greater than α.
Proof. Suppose S is a (w, α)-CFC. In a cover-free code any codeword agrees in less than (1−α)v places with any other w codewords. Now, let us view the codewords of S as FH sequences of a (v, k, m)-FHS. Then we have G(X, S ′ ) = |I(X, S ′ )| < (1 − α)v, for any S ′ ⊆ S, |S ′ | = w and any X ∈ S \ S ′ . That is, any FH sequence experiences interference in fewer than (1 − α)v time slots from any other w FH sequences of the (v, k, m)-FHS. Thenρ w (X, S ′ ) > α for all X, S ′ . Therefore the worst-case w-throughput is greater than α,ρ w (S) > α.
Conversely, suppose we have a (v, k, m)-FHS, S, such thatρ w (S) > α. Clearly we have ρ w (X, S ′ ) ≥ α for any X ∈ S and any S ′ ⊆ S \ {X}, |S ′ | = w. Again if we consider the FH sequences in S as codewords, we have the following. Any codeword in S has less than (1 − α)v positions in which corresponding symbols are the same as those of any w codewords of the code, 1 − 
Jamming Resistance Properties for Cover-Free Codes
We now consider the throughput of cover free codes in the presence of both mutual interference and a jammer. We delve into further properties that cover-free codes should have to mitigate an (θ 1 , θ 2 )-adaptive jammer. For simplicity, we assume θ 1 m = θ 2 m = 1.
Consider a (v, k, m;ρ w (S))-FHS, S, over F. In any session there are w + 1 FH sequences that are in use by legitimate users. We call these active FH sequences. Let S ′′ ⊆ S be the set of active FH sequences. At any time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1, in a session, there are at most w + 1 frequency channels in use, which we call active channels. At any time slot t, let the multiset
) denote all the channels that appear in all the FH sequences at that time. The vector M t = (a 0 , ..., a m−1 ) denotes the multiplicity of each channel at time slot t, where A jammer aims to identify an active FH sequence as quickly as possible. It can then reduce the worst-case w-throughput to 0, or close to 0. We call the jammer's search space the set of FH sequences S * t , a subset of the (v, k, m;ρ w (S))-FHS, which the jammer needs to look at to identify an active FH sequence on time slot t. At the beginning of a session, t = 0, the search space is the whole frequency hopping scheme, S * 0 = S. Let the number of time slots it takes a jammer to determine an active FH sequence be denoted γv, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. It is desirable that γ be large. The aim of a (v, k, m;ρ w (S))-FHS, S, is to make the jammer's advantage not much better than a random guess.
We now explore the behaviour of a jammer given a frequency hopping scheme.
A jammer can trivially reduce the worst-case w-throughput of S to 0 if S ′′ = S. If S ′′ = S, then all sequences are active frequency hopping sequences. A jammer can choose any frequency hopping sequence X ∈ S and jam this sequence from the beginning of the session until the end, at each and every time slot. As a mitigation strategy we have:
M1 Use only a fraction of S, that is S ′′ ⊂ S.
If the jammer does not know F active t or M active t then it can always guess which frequency channel to eavesdrop on. At time 0, there are k FH sequences assumed to be equally likely over m frequency channels, and for each frequency channel i there are a i FH sequences of that frequency channel. The probability that frequency channel i is active is
The probability in (15) is maximum when the jammer selects a frequency channel i such that a i ≥ a j for all i = j. Therefore, if there exists some i such that a i ≥ a j for all i = j, then a jammer will choose frequency channel i to jam. A jammer follows the same strategy at any time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1. As a mitigation strategy against the ( 
M3
For all FH sequences with frequency channel i at time slot t, all frequency channels on the next time slot t + 1 should be uniformly distributed. This forces a jammer to guess randomly at any time slot.
Properties M2 and M3 describes an orthogonal array. Definition 4.7 ( Hedayat, Sloane and Stufken, [8] ). A k × v array A with entries from F is said to be an orthogonal array with m levels, strength t ′ , 0 ≤ t ′ ≤ v − 1, and index λ if every k × t ′ subarray of A contains each t ′ tuple based on F exactly λ times as a row and is denoted
It is well known that an orthogonal array of certain parameters are MDS codes as given by the following theorem. Now we introduce a (
Since at any time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1, the number of times any symbol in F is used is uniform, a jammer randomly guesses a symbol to eavesdrop on. For any active symbol in F that it eavesdrops on, a jammer will have successfully identified an active codeword if the multiplicity of that frequency channel is 1. Otherwise, at time slot t + 1 its search is concentrated on the codewords with that particular symbol that appeared in the previous time slot. However, for any inactive symbol in F it eavesdrops on at any time slot t, it removes from its search space the codewords with that specific symbol and on t + 1 continues its search on the remaining codewords at time t. The jammer continues this action until either of the following happens:
• One active codeword is identified or the size of its search space is at most the number of active codewords.
• The session ends.
Searching until the end of the session means the jammer failed to identify an active codeword within the session.
Let us call a jammer that eavesdrops on an active and inactive channel at a time slot, t, t are discarded at this stage. Note that a lucky jammer always reduces the search space at least as quickly as an unlucky jammer. At any time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ t ′ , |S * t | = (m − 1) B m t ′ −t where B, 0 ≤ B ≤ t ≤ t ′ , is the number of time slots on which a jammer has been unlucky. Consider time slot t ′ . We now discuss what different values of B means with respect to the size of the jammer's search space and how long it takes to identify an active sequence:
• If B = 0, that is a jammer has been lucky at all the t ′ time slots, then S * t ′ = 1. Only one active sequence remain in the jammer's search space at this time slot thereby successfully identifying an active sequence.
• If B = t ′ , that is a jammer has been unlucky at all the t ′ time slots, then S * t ′ = (m − 1) t ′ . Inactive sequences are discarded from the jammer's search space at each of the t ′ time slots. However, unless w + 1 > (m − 1) t ′ , this jammer will take at least t ′ to identify an active sequence.
• For any other value of B such that B = 0, t ′ we have |S * t ′ | = (m − 1) B > 1, and S * t ′ with possibly both active and inactive sequences. So, a change of luck does not speed up the time to identify an active sequence as it will take at least as long as the jammer that is always lucky at every time slot. 
then a jammer needs at least t ′ time slots to identify an active sequence.
The bound on the number of active sequences for a (v, m t ′ , m; v − t ′ + 1)-MDS code in Theorem 4.9 is to make sure that the ( 1 m , 1 m )-adaptive jammer who is unlucky all the time will also take at least t ′ time slots to identify an active sequence.
In Example 4.10, we show that given a (v, m t ′ , m)-MDS code, using w + 1 > (m − 1) t ′ can make a jammer identify an active sequence in less than t ′ time slots. Example 4.10. Consider a (3, 3 2 , 3)-FHS, S = {X i |1 ≤ i ≤ 9} where X 1 = (1, 1, 2), X 2 = (1, 2, 1), X 3 = (1, 3, 3 ), X 4 = (2, 1, 1), X 5 = (2, 2, 3), X 6 = (2, 3, 2), X 7 = (3, 1, 3), X 8 = (3, 2, 2) and X 9 = (3, 3, 1).
Suppose a jammer is unlucky for three consecutive time slots t = 0, 1, 2. The size of the search space at t = 0, t = 1 and t = 2 is |S * 0 | = 9, |S * 1 | = 6 and |S * 2 | = 4 respectively. Let w + 1 = 6. Suppose F active 0 = (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2) . If a jammer is unlucky on t 0 , that is it listens on the inactive channel 3, then |S * 1 | = 6 and S * 1 has all the six active sequences. So, it only needed to eavesdrop on a single time slot to identify the active sequences. Then it starts jamming from t = 1 until the end of the session. From Table 2 it can be seen that there is a trade off between α, the lower bound of the worstcase w-throughput in the presence of mutual interference, and γv, how long it takes a jammer to identify an active sequence. Note that by increasing the number of sequences, k, while the length, v, and the size of the frequency library, m, is fixed, then α diminishes while the resilience of the FHS improves. However, the FHS does not withstand our jammer for long. A solution to this dilemma would be to restart the FHS every γv time slots. This will be elaborated further in Section 5 where an FHS is constructed that guarantees a w-throughput of 1 in the presence of mutual interference and withstands a jammer for an entire session.
A Secure and Efficient FHS
Section 4 demonstrated the limits of how secure an FHS based on codes can be. In this section, we therefore propose that in order to withstand the attack of an adaptive jammer, some form of pseudorandomness must be introduced. Indeed, the schemes proposed in [13] are able to withstand an adaptive jammer for the entire session, at the expense of additional computational burden, and on the assumption of a secure pseudorandom number generator. We provide a novel interpretation of one of these schemes.
Strongly resilient Latin square (sR-LS) scheme [13] Let Z be a set of size v. A Latin square of order v defined over Z is a v × v array L such that no element of Z appears more than once in a row or in any column of L. Suppose x ∈ Z. Let L + x = [β ij ] v×v where β ij = α ij + x mod v. Then L + x is also a Latin square.
A Latin square L = [α ij ] v×v of order v over Z v can be used to construct a frequency hopping scheme as follows. Let K be a long term key shared by all legitimate users. Let F be a pseudorandom function that takes inputs K, s the session number, and t the current time slot. A slot key x t is generated at each time slot as x t = F (K; s; t).
Let F be a frequency library of size v. Let L be a v × v Latin square, L = [α ij ] v×v . The frequency hopping sequences for an sR-LS frequency hopping scheme are given as,
where β ij = α ij + x t mod v.
Note that the sR-LS scheme has v FH sequences used in a session, and a worst-case (v − 1)-throughput of 1. It can be viewed in two ways,
• A collection of v (v, v, v; 1)-FHS which are MDS codes of minimum distance v, where each FHS is used only once.
• An MDS code with minimum distance 1, that is a (v, v v , v; 1)-FHS. Only v sequences are used and these are determined by the pseudorandom number generator.
It can be seen that in this scheme the v frequency channels at each time slot are unique. Therefore we have the maximum achievable w-throughput of 1 for any w, 1 ≤ w < v. Now, consider the presence of a ( The jammer has no knowledge of K the long term key, as it is shared by only the legitimate users. Further, a fresh pseudorandom number x t is generated at each time slot which means a new Latin square is generated at each time slot. Therefore a ( 
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed frequency hopping schemes in the presence of both legitimate sequences of the system as well as FH sequences of an adaptive adversary. We have provided a system model and attacker model for this type of communication.
Cover-free codes have been considered as frequency hopping schemes as they give a defined bound on the worst-case throughput of the schemes. Further we considered mitigating strategies for cover-free codes to be used in the presence of both mutual and adversarial interference. However, we show that in the presence of our adaptive adversary, the cover-free code based frequency hopping schemes do not withstand the adaptive jammer for long.
Finally, we described the strongly resilient Latin square (sR-LS) scheme proposed in [13] and showed that it can be viewed as a cover-free code used in conjunction with pseudo random number generator and this provides a frequency hopping scheme with high throughput that can be used in the presence of an adversary.
